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THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL LAW IN ARISTOTLE 
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In reading Aristotle's ethical, political, and jurisprudential writings we 
often come upon the term physis, which we may translate as "by the order 
of nature." In ancient political theory this term physis was often con-
trasted with nomos or "that which is by convention." I will argue in this 
paper that Aristotle's use of the term physis in certain ethical, political, 
and legal texts does not imply a natural law doctrine as it is usually 
understood. For to so interpret the term physis would render much of his 
ethical, legal, and moral philosophy incoherent. 
We must now state how the term natural law will be understood in this 
paper. Admittedly natural law (jus naturale) has had a checkered and 
irresolute history. But I believe that I can claim for it at least the following 
elements: The doctrine holds that the enacted or the positive laws of a 
polity are suitable objects for moral evaluation. Such evaluation is con-
ducted by reference to a "higher" or "natural law." The ethical-legal 
norms of this "higher law" are supposed to be universally valid and there-
fore natural. As such they are discoverable by reason alone. The natural 
law is understood as a set of precepts or rules against which positive laws 
can be measured for their moral validity. Because these rules or precepts 
are universal their proper understanding excludes conflicting moral judg-
ments about any positive law to which they are applied. In principle, the 
natural law can nullify the positive laws of a state. The moral validity of 
positive law obtains only insofar as its content corresponds to the stan-
dards of the natural law. Finally, the doctrine usually claims that for the 
existence of a just social order the laws of nature must be exemplified in 
the positive law. With this at least tentative usage in mind we may now 
consider Aristotle and that which is "by nature" (Physis) in his texts. 
Aristotle's views of law are not easily determined. The sources arc not 
uniformly located, and their meanings do not enjoy a scholarly consensus. 
But we can begin our quest for his views by noting the claim in the 
Nicomachean Ethics that the moral part of human behavior is understood 
as "reason prompted by desire." (ratiocinative desire ).1 While Aristotle 
also claims that moral virtue must involve the factor of habit, habit alone 
will not account for moral choice. It is also required that an intellectual 
virtue, or a practical wisdom be present. Indeed, this wisdom or phrollesis 
is "indispensable to moral virtues and is implied by them. ,,2 Ethical wis-
dom as a variety of phronesis always involves action and choice, but its 
determinations are contingent and variable, or true for the most part and 
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adapted to particular situations. Aristotle opposes phronesis to theoretical 
wisdom (theoreia) which is the understanding of the unchanging and 
necessary.3 Theoreia is assigned to the provinces of metaphysics and 
natural science. 
Of course, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics attempts to provide a 
method for determining the rules of right action. But the rules which he 
determines never supply any absolute or unchanging norms for the evalu-
ation of human conduct. Aristotle has excluded from the realm of theoriea 
the arts and the practical study which ethics is supposed to be. Law 
making is a subdivision of practical wisdom, and it cannot achieve the 
ethical or legal determinations which enjoy the status of theoreia. But such 
a status would seem to be required if Aristotle's juristic norms are to be 
universally unchanging as our usage of the term natural law requires. Such 
a province of jurisprudence would require theoreia for its rule formation. 
But Aristotle exludes this possibility. 
But at this point Aristotle's texts present an issue which must be 
addressed: The Nicomachean Ethics speaks of a law which is unwritten 
and everywhere recognized which does "not exist by people's thinking this 
or that.,,4 Also, in the Rhetoric Aristotle speaks of a universal law, a 
koinos nomos, which is unwritten and everywhere recognized.s If these 
references indicate in Aristotle the presence of natural law as we have 
defined it, then I would argue that we must face the following conse-
quences: (1) parts of Aristotle's jurisprudential and political theories 
become incoherent because they contain strong positivistic features; (2) 
we must strongly suggest, and leave open for discussion, the possibility 
that Aristotle is alluding to something other than our notion of natural 
law. Due to lack of space this possibility will have to remain the subject of 
discussion. 
In facing the possibility of our first consequent I will maintain that 
Aristotle's jurisprudence does not entail incoherence because Aristotle 
does not attempt to generate a jus naturale theory. His crucial texts will 
not support such a position. In the Politics it is the state which calls men's 
rights into existence and pronounces what is just and unjust. Justice can 
only exist between men whose relations are goverened by law. Indeed, it is 
the positive law which is the determining factor for justice and injustice. In 
the Politics we find: 
For justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are goverened by 
law ... and legal justice is the determination of the just and unjust.' 
Justice as a virtue is assigned ethical priority only insofar as it involves a 
conception of all other virtues. The positive law is not derived deductively 
or inferentially from the prior conception of justice. 
76 
Positive laws, too, are not to be confounded with the principles of a 
constitution. Laws in Aristotle are rules by which magistrates should 
administer the state, and by which the state proceeds against offenders. All 
laws must be laid down to fit the various constitutions. They are posterior 
to the constitution. The constitution is not made to fit the laws. 7 It is by 
reference to many kinds of constitutions, not to paradigms of natural law , 
that the legislator knows the best laws. It is also the case that the goodness 
or badness of laws is relative to the constitution for which they are made.8 
Aristotle even suggests that the law may be understood as the will of a 
particular class. 
In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle presents his famous 
analysis of justice and its various subdivisions. Here Aristotle refers only in 
passing to a "natural justice" for his focus is on political justice which he 
divides into complete or universal and particular justice. Since complete 
justice is identified with the whole of virtue and complete citizenship, 
there is apparently no implication here for natural law . Particular justice 
divides into distributive and corrective justice. Distributive justice allocates 
rewards according to merit and by service to the state. Natural law is 
nowhere used as a criterion for this distribution. Corrective justice deter-
mines rewards and punishments according to a mathematical formula 
which prescribes what is proportional in a given case. The appeal is never 
to a natural law. Here again Aristotle conceives the status of the law as 
mere positivity. 
There is, however, some further material in the Rhetoric and the 
Nicomachean Ethics to which we must refer briefly. In the Rhetoric at 
1373b Aristotle refers to a universal law and a natural justice which are 
binding on all men. But he gives no specific analysis of their nature and he 
assigns to these no status regulative of the positive law. But in the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle claims that this justice by physis is subject 
to change. 
This however is not true in the unqualified sense, but is true in a sense; or 
rather with the Gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is 
something that isjust even by nature, yet all of it is changeable" 0 
Here it is difficult if not impossible to see how a law "by physis" which is 
subject to change can serve as a stable criterion by which positive law 
could be either nullified or sanctified. 
In conclusion I have argued that Aristotle's legal texts which are associ-
ated with physis do not support a doctrine of natural law . Neither can the 
physis passages act as a universal and constant set of criteria by which we 
judge the validity of positive law. We have seen that Aristotle recognizes 
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good and bad law, but good or bad positive law is nowhere denied the 
status of true law, as is sometimes the case in Plato. The ethical ends which 
law must serve are varied, and they are defined by phronesis. Phonesis is 
not assigned the task of revealing any unchanging criteria of natural law. 
Nor is theoreia anywhere assigned this task. Indeed, part of the relevance 
and validity of positive law is determined "from above" as it were. But the 
higher agency here is the constitution, and the constitutional form varies 
from polity to polity. Law has no power to command obedience aside 
from the constitutional power of the state (Politics 1269a 20). Finally, the 
law has no status in the Platonic forms, or in the unity of goodness 
doctrine. If goodness is a unity which exists separately or absolutely, said 
Aristotle, it clearly will not be attainable by man.1 I 
Aristotle's actual political theory makes it necessary, then, to reo 
examine those passages in which he speaks of a universal law and justice 
"by physis." This paper does not propose that there are not social and 
even moral entities which are "by physis." It only cares to examine the 
implications of a legal order "by physis" when we are intending natural 
law doctrine. Also this paper does not claim that those passages which 
refer to "universal law," and "universal justice" are meaningless or that 
they have no systematic import. Their import can be explored in discus· 
sion if desired. Rather, I want to suggest that the "by physis" passages, 
when they are construed as an immanent of actual doctrine of jus naturale, 
render Aristotle's teaching on politics, law and ethics problematic if not 
incoherent. 
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